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Russo: Gay Panic Defense

HOW TO GET AWAY WITH MURDER:
THE “GAY PANIC” DEFENSE
Omar T. Russo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In April of 2018, a jury found 69-year-old James Miller of
Austin, Texas not guilty of murder for the 2015 slaying of his neighbor,
Daniel Spencer.1 The jury convicted Miller of criminally negligent
homicide, a crime that earned him a mere six months in jail followed
by ten years of probation.2 During the night, Miller had invited
Spencer, his 32-year-old neighbor, to his house where they drank and
listened to music; the two were musicians.3 Miller claims that he
rejected a kiss from Spencer and that Miller stabbed Spencer in a
panic.4
Miller’s defense counsel argued that he acted in self-defense,
in a manner known unofficially as the “gay panic defense.”5 The “gay
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro Law Center; Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, Hartwick
College, Oneonta, New York. I would like to first thank Professor Meredith Miller for her
patience and guidance in bringing this work to fruition, as well as Madeleine Laser, Notes
Editor, for her consistency, direction and encouragement through this process. I thank my
mother and family for their support and curiosity, which inspired continued dedication to the
topic. Finally, I would like to thank Ali and Aaron Goldsmith, who always inspire me, and
who represent the very best of the legal profession and its core values of service, advocacy,
and decency. I humbly dedicate this work to the immeasurable number of LGBT folks around
the world who have suffered unthinkable injustice, fear, hate and violence in their everyday
lives; and to the pioneers at Stonewall who risked it all.
1 Jackie Salo, Man Who Used ‘Gay Panic’ Defense for Killing Neighbor Avoids Prison,
N.Y. POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/04/27/man-who-used-gay-panic-defensefor-killing-neighbor-avoids-prison/.
2 Id.
3 Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., A Former Police Employee Said He Killed a Man in ‘a Gay Panic’
– an Actual Legal Defense That Worked, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/27/a-former-cop-said-hekilled-a-man-in-a-gay-panic-an-actual-legal-defense-that-worked/?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.5aafde75b8f6.
4 Id.
5 A.B.A. RES. 113A, at 6 (2013), https://lgbtbar.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2014/02/Ga
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panic” defense stems from a phenomenon originally coined by
psychotherapist Edward J. Kempf in 1920, who claimed that, in his
studies of heterosexual-identifying males, they became agitated,
enraged and panicked by their acute homosexual thoughts or ideas.6
The psychological concerns described by Kempf were not out of touch
with the times, given the classification of “homosexuality” as a
medically-recognized disorder until 1973.7
Today, the gay panic defense is still used to influence jurors to
mitigate a violent defendant’s conviction or sentence based on the
premise that an individual of the same sex had a romantic interest in
the defendant, which consequently, struck some panic within the
defendant and caused the defendant to react violently.8 The defense is
based upon “homophobia and transphobia, and send[s] the wrong
message that violence against LGBT people is acceptable.”9
In an era post-pathological homosexuality, cases such as the
Texas murder of Daniel Spencer effectively move the focus from the
defendant to the victim.10 The defense puts the victim under a
y-and-Trans-Panic-Defenses-Resolution.pdf. What will be referred to as the gay panic defense
throughout this Note actually encompasses both that and the trans panic defense, in which
similar justification is offered for crimes resulting in the discovery or assumption of a victim’s
gender identity. “Gay panic defense” itself, for the purposes of the Note, will serve as an
umbrella term comprising the two phenomena.
6 EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477 (1920), https://archive.org/details/390020863
48753.med.yale.edu. For the purposes of this Note, the word “homosexual” will be used
scarcely to refer to the intimacy between two same-sex partners or their sexual orientation.
The word today exists with undertones of hate and prejudice that linger from the days of
Kempf, in which such intimacy was viewed as a legitimate medical condition. In describing
marriage, intimacy or relationship, “[s]ubstitute the word ‘gay’ . . . and the terms suddenly
become far less loaded, so that the ring of disapproval and judgement evaporates.” Jeremy W.
Peters, The Decline and Fall of the ‘H’ Word, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/fashion/gays-lesbians-the-term-homosexual.html. For
the purposes of this Note, the terms LGBT, gay or trans will be used in place of the word
homosexual, often, if not always in reference to the broader lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender
community. “LGBT” will be used to describe the broader community of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and queer-identifying individuals. The word transgender is commonly understood
to be an umbrella term encompassing a wide range of gender identities falling outside of the
binary male and female categories.
7 Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 565
(2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4695779.
8 Gay/Trans Panic Defense, LGBT B., https://lgbtbar.org/what-we-do/programs/gay-andtrans-panic-defense (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
9 JORDAN BLAIR WOODS ET AL., MODEL LEGISLATION FOR ELIMINATING THE GAY AND TRANS
PANIC DEFENSES 3 (2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016Model-GayTransPanic-Ban-Laws-final.pdf.
10 David Alan Perkiss, A New Strategy for Neutralizing the Gay Panic Defense at Trial:
Lessons From the Lawrence King Case, 60 UCLA L. REV. 778, 797 (2013).
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microscope regarding his or her identity, rather than placing the
defendant under the microscope for his or her own conduct. The jury’s
attention is effectively taken from the violent act and placed rather on
who the victim was, and what about the victim could have in some way
led to this chain of events. This course of action falls under the
phenomenon of “victim-blaming,” where attackers (often in sexual
abuse cases, but not exclusively) assert that a victim has “contributed
to the causation of her [or his] own rape.”11 Further, victim-blaming
is not only used within the context of rape; the tactic is similarly
employed in the context of domestic violence and has allowed for the
expansion of the gay panic defense.12 As such, in a society struggling
to deprogram our victim-blaming mentality, the gay panic defense is
able to flourish.
In order for the gay panic defense to work the way that it has,
defendants have had to prove that “the victim’s unwanted, nonviolent
homosexual advance was characterized as an external stimulus causing
the defendant’s homicidal reaction.”13 To reach such an assumption,
one must accept the premise that gays are, in some way, provocative
by nature or in a position to cause great anxiety and distress that
triggers one’s sentiment that there exists no reasonable measure other
than a violent or homicidal outburst.
The reality is that, throughout our institutions of government,
LGBT persons are a “politically powerless minority group because
they are grossly underrepresented in our nation’s legislative bodies.”14
For decades, the LGBT community has suffered from social isolation
and damnation as mentally ill.15 Apart from the societal and political
detriment suffered, members of the LGBT community suffered in
private, as intimate conduct amongst gays was methodologically

11

Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1463 (1999).
12 Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 647 (2003)
(discussing victim-blaming in the context of domestic violence criminal prosecutions and that
“[j]ustification defenses are the most obvious examples of formal victim blaming doctrines in
criminal law. The doctrines of self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property base
justification of an intentional killing exclusively on the victim’s behavior.”).
13 Perkiss, supra note 10, at 797.
14 Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of
LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y. 385, 385 (2010).
15 Id. at 385, 390-91.
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criminalized in our country for most of its existence.16 The notion that
one’s sexual identity or non-violent romantic gesture prompted
justifiable murder is cause for great concern, considering what this
means for victims in our criminal justice system.
The core issue that this Note seeks to address is that LGBT
individuals face adversity in our courts in the form of prejudicial
victim-blaming, having their sexuality or gender orientation used as
justification for the violent attack perpetrated against him or her. It is
well-established that LGBT people in this country face adversity at
disproportionately high rates in terms of poverty, discrimination and
violence.17 Specifically, the prevalence of sexual and physical
violence is significantly higher against LGBTs than their straight
counterparts.18 The disparity, and pervasive acts of oppression, are
even greater where intersectionality of identities exists, such as race
and ethnicity.19 The gay panic defense, as the author will discuss, does
immeasurable damage to our system of justice by promoting
oppression against the LGBT community by endangering its already
insecure fundamental rights.20
The basis for the gay panic defense is highly troublesome for
reasons beyond the clear violence concerns; namely, its due process
implications. In an era where gay conduct is protected from
government intervention through some recognition of individuals’
rights to privacy in personal sexual conduct, the gay panic defense is
legally flawed.21 While admittedly the courtroom is a place where
one’s privacy often takes the back burner in pursuit of justice, it is hard
to imagine a society in which one’s religion is somehow justification
for panic-driven murder, or in similar analogy, one’s racial
background; assuming that logic is sound, how then can the sexual
orientation or gender identity of an individual, something so

16

Id.
Jordan Blair Woods, LGBT Identity and Crime, 105 CAL. L. REV. 667, 719 (2017).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 719-20 (describing the increased crime rates where an individual falls under either:
more than one category under the LGBT umbrella or the LGBT umbrella and another
historically disadvantaged or minority group).
20 As of 2016, 4.1% of the United States population self-identified to fall somewhere along
the LGBT spectrum, amounting to approximately 10 million Americans. Gary J. Gates, In
U.S., More Adults Identifying as LGBT, GALLUP (Jan. 11, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/
201731/lgbt-identification-rises.aspx.
21 See infra note 75 (discussing the protection of privacy rights enumerated in the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution).
17
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fundamental to one’s being and so personal in nature, not violate the
privacy protections established by the Supreme Court?22
Contemporarily, a defense of panic, based on arbitrary
characteristics of another person, is illogical and poorly reflective of
our current state of law, justice and societal opinion. The gay panic
defense continues to perpetuate the inaccurate notion that LGBT
people trigger fear in others; that an LGBT individual’s unwanted and
nonviolent romantic advances are justification for violence, or even
murder. To bring the issue of a victim’s sexual orientation to focus as
a defense tactic is “like placing a woman’s sexual promiscuity at issue
to show consent to rape.”23
Essentially, the gay panic defense should be prohibited in all
courts across the country because victims’ perceived or actual gender
identities or sexual orientations should not serve as a defense or
justification for violence. Trial courts throughout the country must
recognize the delicate balancing test applied similarly under rape
shield laws, measuring probative value against undue prejudice, which
mostly prevents admission of a rape victim’s sexual history. 24 While
some have recognized the use of the gay panic defense, few have
analyzed the statutory bans enacted in a handful of states, and the
impact that bans or the defense could realistically have.
Although only California, Illinois, and Rhode Island have
passed legislation to proactively ban the defense, similar legislation is
pending at the federal level and in several states and the District of
Columbia.25 This Note blends decades of sociological and legal
transitions, with regard to sexuality and gender, to set forth a
comprehensive solution to one of the gay rights movement’s
contemporary struggles: the use of the gay panic defense. In Section
II of this Note, the author examines the origin and development of the
defense. Section III is devoted to the history of the LGBT community
in the United States, and how deep-seated prejudice has pervaded the
22

See infra note 75.
Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508,
1548 n.187 (1989).
24 As a result of public pressure, “rape shield laws” were passed to encourage women to
come forward in reporting sexual assaults and “limited the admission of . . . prior sexual
history [as] evidence at trial. As a result, both the reporting and prosecution of opposite-sex
rape increased.” Elizabeth J. Kramer, When Men are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to
Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 296 (1998) (arguing that rape shield laws,
historically used to protect female victims on trial against their male abusers, should be used
to protect male victims from male abusers).
25 See supra note 8.
23
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judicial system and allowed for a defense of this nature to make its way
into our courts. Section III continues with an analysis of the country’s
high-profile LGBT rights cases and how they have changed the shape
of LGBT bias. Section IV examines the phenomenon of victimblaming and the use of the gay panic defense as another form of that
dangerous issue. Section V discusses the current and pending state
bans on the defense used in criminal proceedings. The author
describes how other jurisdictions may enact similar legislation or take
proactive steps to ban the defense. Finally, in Section VI, this Note
concludes with policy recommendations that may provide adequate
protection of LGBT persons in courts throughout the country.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE GAY PANIC DEFENSE

The gay panic defense is not a creation of the legislature or the
courts, which is why it is considered, by most, an “unofficial” defense,
hidden beneath the surface and used in conjunction with recognized
legal defenses.26 While the gay panic defense, itself, is unrecognized
in any jurisdiction in the country, defendants typically inject it as an
undertone of their defense in typically one of three recognized
defenses: self-defense, provocation, or diminished capacity/insanity.27
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”), while not adopted by every
jurisdiction in the country, is described as the “closest thing to being
an American criminal code” because it encompasses the general ideas
of cross-jurisdictional criminal law.28 Self-defense, provocation, and
diminished capacity/insanity are the main defenses typically available,
under the MPC, to a criminal defendant charged with homicide.
Under section 3.04 of the MPC, self-defense is described, in
relevant part, as:
the use of force upon or toward another person is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting

26 See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 475 (2008)
(describing the unofficial strategy of the defense and that “[t]here is no officially recognized
‘gay panic’ defense, but many use the term to refer to defense strategies that rely on the notion
that a criminal defendant should be excused or justified if his violent actions were in response
to a (homo)sexual advance.”).
27 A.B.A. RES. 113A, supra note 5, at 1.
28 Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007).
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himself against the use of unlawful force by such other
person on the present occasion.29
The defense is limited in its applicability and, thus, is “not
justifiable . . . unless the actor believe[s] that such force is necessary
to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.”30 Similarly, the use
of such force is further limited when an actor can reasonably retreat by
engaging in non-violent conduct to escape the circumstances; the
retreat requirement does not apply, however, when a victim is in his or
her home.31
Next, provocation often refers to a murder that was committed
under extreme emotional disturbance. The MPC additionally requires
that the disturbance have a reasonable explanation or excuse.32 The
MPC provides that criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter, as
opposed to murder, when the homicide is “committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
is reasonable explanation or excuse.”33
Finally, the MPC permits the defense of mental disease or
defect, which in practice treats the defendant as lacking requisite intent
or responsibility (insanity or diminished capacity).34 Section 4.01(1)
of the MPC provides that:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease of
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.35
As applied to the gay panic defense, a defendant may claim that
he acted in self-defense when he foresaw a sexual attempt by the
victim, While it is possible that no evidence supports such a claim, or
even evidence to the contrary, the very exposure of the victim’s
sexuality through such testimony or extrinsic evidence allows for bias
to pervade the jury box rather than the merits of the case. Similarly, a

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 2018).
Id. § 3.04(2)(b).
Id. § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(a).
Id. § 210.3(1)(b).
Id.
Id. § 4.01(1).
Id.
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defendant may assert that he acted under extreme emotional
disturbance, that his overwhelming fear of the gay victim produced this
homicidal reaction. If one accepts the possibility that a juror may share
a similar sentiment, then it follows that a juror may find gayness to be
a reasonable explanation or excuse as required under the MPC. Lastly,
under the insanity defense, a criminal defendant may assert a lapse of
capacity to understand or appreciate the severity of his actions, that his
fear and panic so clouded his judgment that murder no longer held the
weight it normally would.
Successful use of the gay panic defense in any form has
immeasurable consequences socially and to our criminal justice
system. Allowing a defendant to receive any benefit for the violence
he perpetrates against another, based solely on the victim’s LGBT
status or perceived status, worsens implicit bias of jurors and further
implies that LGBT persons’ lives are less valuable. Banning the use
of the gay panic defense should not be considered a radical move, one
that diminishes defendants’ rights or narrows tactical advantages at
trial, but rather a method of allowing our laws and protections to
progress with society’s evolving and accepting attitudes toward LGBT
people.
The gay panic defense has survived decades, evolving over the
years through improper and prejudicial litigation techniques rooted in
homophobia.36 The defense has grown out of “ideological fictions
[that] work to support this prejudicial legal doctrine.”37 The first
known use of the gay panic defense was the California case People v.
Rodriguez,38 where the defendant argued that he had been touched
sexually by the victim while urinating in an alley.39
In Rodriguez, the defendant beat to death an elderly man with
a tree branch after following him into his yard where he was emptying
his garbage.40 The defendant argued a different version of the case,
that after his friends had stolen a woman’s purse, he ran to urinate in
an alley when he was grabbed by the victim from behind.41 Fearing

36 Perkiss, supra note 10, at 797 (discussing the transition from the defense’s roots in
medical science to a contemporary legal defense).
37
Casey Charles, Panic in the Project: Critical Queer Studies and the Matthew Shepard
Murder, 18 LAW & LITERATURE 225, 230 (2006).
38 People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1967).
39 Perkiss, supra note 10, at 797 (citing Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1967)).
40 See supra note 38.
41 Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
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the man was “trying to engage in a homosexual act,” the defendant
picked up the branch and fatally beat the victim over the head.42
The inconsistencies in the story the defense told were striking
at trial. An expert testified at trial that the defendant was not acting
under “acute homosexual panic,” but was sane when he committed the
murder.43 The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree;
however, the jury returned a guilty verdict for murder in the second
degree because the gay panic defense had successfully mitigated the
defendant’s actions.44 This case opened the door for use of the gay
panic defense as a mitigating factor for defendants’ violent actions.45
Although the expert physician provided testimony as to the
defendant’s sanity, which the jury accepted, the fear-based nature of
the defendant’s alleged account of being touched while urinating
ultimately led to a reduced conviction.
Although the facts
demonstrated the prosecutor’s account of the incident, and evidence
contradicting the defendant’s was persuasive, the defense worked and
the jury empathized with the defendant.
The consequences of the legal doctrine effectively established
by Rodriguez have been amplified and carried into contemporary
criminal proceedings. The gay panic defense is successful, not because
the nation supports violence or murder, but rather because of the
enduring societal intolerance for LGBT people. Today, reports show
that overall acceptance of same-sex relationships is at an all-time high,
with 75% of people claiming same-sex relations “should be legal” and
67% reporting their belief that “gay and lesbian relations” are “morally

42

Id.
Id.
44 Id. at 254. See also supra note 32 (the defendant successfully mitigated his crime through
the assertion that he was in some way provoked or under extreme emotional disturbance
stemming from the victim’s sexuality).
45 The mitigating factor is a topic of the law, which can have potentially impressive
implications on a defendant’s case, most particularly with regard to sentencing. Mitigating
factors are typically used in sentencing when “the severity of the punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). Put
differently, when a defendant’s actions may be explained or to some degree justified, this is
cause for consideration in sentencing and rulings by the judge. Mitigating factors are even
statutory to a certain degree in most states. New York, for example, includes a catchall
provision in the mitigating factor statute stating that a mitigating factor may include anything
“concerning the crime, the defendant’s state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or
the defendant’s character, background or record that would be relevant to mitigation or
punishment for the crime.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(f) (McKinney 2018).
43
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acceptable.”46 However, the support revealed by such national polls is
not uniform because such support drastically varies throughout
regions, states and localities.47
LGBT sentiment differs
geographically, adding a layer of complexity in discerning true public
support or opposition.48 Additionally, given that these polls are selfreporting, they can fail to report true sentiment, and instead may reveal
“an increasing reluctance to admit bias against queerfolk.”49
The defense attorney in one of the benchmark gay panic
defense cases out of Illinois described the not guilty verdict as “antirape” rather than anti-gay, in a manner consistent with arguments of
most gay panic defense ban opponents.50
Defendant Joseph
Biedermann walked free after being acquitted of first degree murder
for stabbing his neighbor, Terrance Hauser, over sixty times. 51 The
incident occurred in March of 2008, when the two men left a local
tavern for Hauser’s apartment after Biedermann became too
intoxicated and a bartender refused to serve Biedermann any more
alcohol.52 Biedermann testified that the two continued to drink at
Hauser’s apartment where they eventually passed out.53 When he
woke up, Biedermann claimed, Hauser was on top of him with a sword
at his neck, demanding that Biedermann undress and engage in sexual
acts.54 Thereafter, Biedermann admitted to using a dagger to stab
Hauser in order to escape.55 At trial, prosecutors asserted that
Biedermann was far larger and less intoxicated than his victim, and
that stabbing Hauser dozens of times clearly was unnecessary.56
Despite the extreme violence, and the “bloody overkill,” the
defendant was, shockingly, acquitted based on the notion that
46 Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbianrights.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
47 Chan Tov McNamarah, Sexuality on Trial: Expanding Pena-Rodriguez to Combat Juror
Queerphobia, 17 DUKEMINIER AWARDS J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY L. 393,
397-99 (2018).
48 Id. at 397.
49 Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added).
50 Eric Zorn, Murder Defendant Gambles – and Wins, CHI. TRIB. (July 17, 2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2009-07-17-0907160827-story.html.
51 Id.
52
Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Chicago Murder Acquittal Blamed on “Gay Panic”, CRIME REP. (July 17, 2009),
https://thecrimereport.org/2009/07/17/chicago-murder-acquittal-blamed-on-gay-panic/.
56 Id.
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“homosexual overtures are themselves sufficient provocation for acts
of extreme violence.”57 The political director of Equality Illinois
claimed that the verdict was based “not on the facts but on deep seated
anti-gay sentiment.”58
III.

A DEEPLY ROOTED LGBT BIAS IN THE LAW

Persecution of gays in the United States has existed since its
colonial days.59 In fact, in 1776 at the birth of the nation, gay male
conduct was punishable by death in each of the thirteen colonies,
pursuant to borrowed English law.60 However, the late eighteenth
century marked the start of a period of enlightenment, exploration and
experimentation in the United States that is often unrecognized today.61
Prior to World War II, a “gay world” thrived, especially in the New
York metropolitan area.62 This is a history somewhat buried beneath
contemporaneous stories of two world wars, a volatile economy, and
widespread national paranoia. As the nation’s general fear of outsiders
grew, so too did its intolerance for those who would be regarded as
“others” at home. As George Chauncey noted,
A battery of laws criminalized not only gay men’s
narrowly “sexual” behavior, but also their association
with one another, their cultural styles, and their efforts
to organize and speak on their own behalf. Their social
marginalization gave the police and popular vigilantes
even broader informal authority to harass them; anyone
discovered to be homosexual was threatened with loss
of livelihood and loss of social respect. Hundreds of
men were arrested each year in New York City alone
for violating such laws.63
As anti-gay sentiment grew in the first half of the twentieth
century, laws developed to reflect the national opinion. Through the
57

Id.
Id.
59 Louis Crompton, Homosexuals and the Death Penalty in Colonial America, 1 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 277, 277 (1976).
60 Id.
61 GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, CULTURE AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY
MALE WORLD 1890-1940, at 1 (1994).
62 Id. at 1-2.
63 Id.
58
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enforcement of sodomy laws, many states engaged in “witch hunts” of
gay men, which served as a legal method of criminalizing “gay
conduct.”64 Such targeted laws were upheld by the nation’s highest
court in the landmark case, Bowers v. Hardwick,65 in which the Court
upheld a Georgia statute forbidding sodomy.66 The respondent argued
that the statute criminalizing sodomy violated his constitutional rights
to privacy and due process.67 Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of
Georgia, thus validating the sodomy laws of that state and similar antisodomy statutes in other states that were used to criminalize gay men’s
conduct across the country. The Court in Bowers reasoned in terms of
morality, that it was not moved by the argument that the perceived
immorality of gay conduct was insufficient to justify the anti-sodomy
law, that in fact it was sufficient.68 The Court further supported its
reasoning that the law “is constantly based on notions of morality, and
if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”69
The issue surrounding the enforcement of sodomy laws would
not be revisited by the Court until 2003, when it overturned its ruling
in Bowers with its holding in Lawrence v. Texas.70 In 1998, responding
to a claim of weapons disturbance, police arrived at the home of John
Geddes Lawrence (“Lawrence”).71 Upon entering the apartment with
guns drawn, the police encountered Lawrence engaging in consensual
64
Richard Weinmeyer, The Decriminalization of Sodomy in the United States, 16 AM. MED.
ASS’N J. ETHICS 916, 916-917 (2014).
65 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66 Georgia’s sodomy statute, which particularly targeted gay men, stated the following:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy
when he commits sodomy with force and against the will of the other
person.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one or more than 20 years. A person
convicted of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more
than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
67 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
68
Id. at 196.
69 Id. (reasoning that even though morality may have been the sole issue at stake in the case,
laws are often born from morals, and that to undo such legislation where contrary to the Due
Process Clause would be incredibly time consuming for the courts).
70 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
71 Id. at 562-63.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/9

12

Russo: Gay Panic Defense

2019

GAY PANIC DEFENSE

823

sex with Tyron Garner.72 The two men were arrested and taken into
custody for violating a Texas statute prohibiting “deviate sexual
intercourse.”73 Lawrence appealed his conviction through the ranks of
the Texas courts; each court rejected his argument that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.74 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the questions
whether the Texas statue criminalizing the sexual intimacy of samesex couples violated the Fourteenth Amendment, namely the provision
for equal protection of the laws, and whether the convictions for “adult
consensual sexual intimacy in the home” violated Lawrence’s interests
in liberty and privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.75
The Supreme Court held that the Texas sodomy statute that
formed the basis for the case served “no legitimate state interest which
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”76 The Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides individuals the “full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government,” effectively
invalidating all state statutes similar to the Texas statute.77 The ruling
by the Court in Lawrence changed the legal landscape for the LGBT
community; states were no longer permitted to interfere with the
personal and private relationships of same-sex couples through the
enforcement of criminal sodomy statutes.
Specifically, the Texas statute that landed Lawrence in the
United States Supreme Court stated, in relevant part, that “[a] person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex.”78 The conduct the statute
describes as “deviate” is defined as, “any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or
. . . the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with
an object.”79 The statute, while unenforceable because of the Court’s

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 578.
Id.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003).
Id. § 21.01.
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ruling in Lawrence, remains on the books in Texas as a lingering
reminder of the prejudice that sullied the State’s institution of law.80
Similar to Texas’s unrepealed sodomy statute, anti-sodomy
laws exist on the books in twelve states, despite the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of such laws, including: Alabama, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas and Utah.81 While some argue that the states’ antisodomy bans remain on the books merely because of the trouble it
would take to detach consensual sodomy from aggravated sodomy
(often contained in a single statute), others maintain that it is a
“reflection of . . . overall homophobia.”82
Lawrence v. Texas stands as a landmark case in the national
progression of LGBT rights because of its dramatic implications on
states’ discriminatory anti-gay practices.83 Society’s understanding,
tolerance and acceptance of LGBT people have allowed for the
progression and expansion of LGBT rights in the United States over
time. In United States v. Windsor,84 the government appealed a Second
Circuit decision that the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C
§ 7, was unconstitutional.85 DOMA addressed the defining factor of
marriage and spouses:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.86
The conflict in Windsor arose when the United States
government refused to recognize Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer’s
marriage for tax purposes following Spyer’s death, despite the fact that
80 Bobby Blanchard, Why Does the Texas Criminal Code Still Ban “Homosexual
Conduct”?, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/03/27/why-doestexas-criminal-code-still-ban-homosexual-conduct/.
81 12 States Still Ban Sodomy a Decade After Court Ruling, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/21/12-states-ban-sodomy-a-decadeafter-court-ruling/7981025/.
82 Id.
83 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
84 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
85 Id. at 2679.
86 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
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the couple was married in Canada.87 While the couple’s domicile, New
York, recognized the marriage that took place in Ontario, Canada, Edie
Windsor was denied her surviving spouse federal estate tax
exemption.88
Ultimately, the Court in Windsor upheld the Second Circuit’s
decision, declaring DOMA unconstitutional based on the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits unequal protection of the
laws by the federal government.89 In analyzing DOMA’s conflict with
constitutional protections, the Court noted that “[w]hile the Fifth
Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade
or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the
more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”90 The
Court reasoned that, “[u]nder DOMA, same-sex married couples have
their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and
public ways. By its great reach, DOMA touches many aspects of
married and family life, from the mundane to the profound.”91
Later, when the Supreme Court decided the case for marriage
equality, Obergefell v. Hodges, it highlighted that the “right of samesex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”92 Moreover, the Court
held that maintaining exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage
“conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry. Without the
recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children
suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”93 The
Court took, perhaps, its most drastic leap in favor of gay rights in its
ruling in Obergefell because it provided legal recognition of same-sex
marriage, acknowledging the need for equality under the laws.
Although the Court’s decisions in Lawrence, Windsor, and
Obergefell represent a socially progressive advancement of LGBT
rights in America, the existence of the gay panic defense is,
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2679.
Id.
Id. at 2695.
Id.
Id. at 2679.
Id. at 2603.
Id. at 2601-02.
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nevertheless, another hurdle standing in the way of progress and the
achievement of equality for the community. The social, political,
economic, and judicial impacts of homophobia have had dramatic
implications on this country for virtually all of its existence.94
However, evolution of law has slowly, but certainly not universally,
begun to change the tides. In New York, the Third Department of the
Appellate Division recently held that to accuse someone of being gay
does not rise to the level of defamation per se.95 When a man was
accused of being gay, he sued the accuser alleging no economic
damages, but simply that the accusation amounted to defamation per
se.96 The court held that being called gay is not so damaging as to
amount to a claim of defamation, and that any decision to that effect is
“inconsistent with current public policy and should no longer be
followed.”97 The court in Yonaty v. Mincolla reasoned that:
In light of the tremendous evolution in social attitudes
regarding homosexuality . . . and the considerable legal
protection and respect that the law of this state now
accords lesbians, gays and bisexuals, it cannot be said
that current public opinion supports a rule that would
equate statements imputing homosexuality with
accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations
that an individual has a loathsome disease.98
The court recognized the clear shift in society’s tolerance for
and, furthermore, acceptance of, LGBT persons within its
communities, rather than as outsiders.
It is without question that the United States has made
significant strides in remedying the extreme hardships faced by LGBT
persons for decades. As with all social movements in our nation’s
history, the Gay Rights Movement’s success has not been universal;
problems persist and the struggle continues. Despite the public’s
94

HATE IN AMERICA: A TOWN ON FIRE (Peacock Productions 2016).
Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012); see also Samuel
Brenner, “Negro Blood in His Veins”: The Development and Disappearance of the Doctrine
of Defamation Per Se By Radical Misidentification in the American South, 50 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 333, 340 (2010) (describing the fact that historically, common law courts have
recognized specific categories of defamation, which are considered defamation per se, or “by
itself,” among these were specifically: representations of criminal conduct, sexual misconduct,
loathsome disease, or negative representations affecting one’s business, or profession).
96 Yonaty, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
97 Id. at 777.
98 Id. at 778-79.
95

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/9

16

Russo: Gay Panic Defense

2019

GAY PANIC DEFENSE

827

evolving views toward LGBT persons, and the law’s reluctant push in
the same direction, gay and transgender individuals continue facing
violence at disproportionately higher rates than any other group of
people.99 In comparing the rates of hate crimes committed against
historically persecuted groups in the United States, LGBT people
today exceed in the numbers by leaps and bounds.100 Furthermore, the
gay panic defense perpetuates the continued violence against LGBT
persons by allowing a perpetrator to mitigate punishment, or avoid it
entirely, solely on the basis of his or her victim’s actual or perceived
sexual orientation or gender identity.101
The discussion of the gay panic defense calls into question hate
crimes and how the differing logic behind the two can be squared, if at
all. Where, on one hand we have hate crime legislation throughout the
country which protects classes of individuals, thus making the identity
of the individual the very fact to be considered central; on the other
hand, we have the proposed ban on gay panic defenses, which asserts
that the violent defendant should not be able to introduce a victim’s
gender identity or sexual orientation. The contradiction is clear, we
are seemingly aiming to pick and choose when and where it may be
convenient to introduce the identity information of a victim, but the
logic is not flawed as it may appear at first glance. In hate crimes, the
focus on identity is to “specify the nature of the crime,” whereas,
asserting the gay panic defense uses identity to mitigate the offense.102
It would be impossible to identify a hate crime without mention of the
classification, whereas it is entirely possible to assert a defense without
the use of the gender or sexual identity of the victim.

99

JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011), https://www.ncgs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/11/Injustice-at-Every-Turn-A-Report-of-the-National-Transgender-DiscriminationSurvey.pdf.
100 See Haeyoun Park & Iaryna Mykhyalyshyn, L.G.B.T. People Are More Likely to Be
Targets of Hate Crimes Than Any Other Minority Group, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/hate-crimes-against-lgbt.html
(“L.G.B.T. people are twice as likely to be targeted as African-Americans, and the rate of hate
crimes against them has surpassed that of crimes against Jews.”); see also Tim Fitzsimons,
Anti-LGBTQ Hate Crimes Rose 3 Percent in ‘17, FBI Finds, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018, 11:58
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/anti-lgbtq-hate-crimes-rose-3-percent-17fbi-finds-n936166 (explaining that 60 percent of over 1,200 separate incidents targeted gay
men).
101 WOODS ET AL., supra note 9.
102 Interview with Professor Jeremy Wisnewski, Professor of Philosophy and Logic,
Hartwick College, Oneonta, New York (Mar. 13, 2019).
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To explore the logic, let us look to a racial analogy. It
is unlikely that a jury would find that a person being
black is sufficient reason to attack them, or even that
their “blackness” struck fear in them. If, in the broader
scheme of this all, “gayness” and blackness have the
same status then, “that same reasoning should apply in
defenses as well as hate crime identification. If sexual
orientation and race are protected under hate crime law,
the same reasoning demands that we include race and
sex as likewise analogous when we consider defenses
based on one or the other.”103
As a society, we readily decline to allow racial or religious bias to serve
as a defense to criminal acts, and sexual orientation and gender are
seemingly no different under the circumstances. According to
Professor Wisnewski, “the logic of similarity should rule the treatment
of similar cases.”104 As it appears, the logic was sound to the
lawmakers of several states, who have successfully implemented some
version of the ban.
IV.

THE GAY PANIC DEFENSE: PERMISSIVE VICTIM BLAMING

The gay panic defense is a method of shifting attention from
the crime committed by the defendant to the victim. This “legal
strategy which asks a jury to find that a victim’s sexual orientation or
gender identity is to blame for the defendant’s violent reaction,”
effectively shifts the defense from the defendant to the victim’s
character or personal identity.105 Such shift in focus in criminal trials
is not a new phenomenon nor one isolated to the context of this
defense. It is a “devaluing act where the victim of a crime, accident,
or any type of abusive maltreatment is held as wholly or partially
responsible for the wrongful conduct committed against them.”106
Courts and legislators have become increasingly aware of
victim-blaming and the need to remedy the prejudicial impact of such

103

Id.
Id.
105 Supra note 8.
106 Victim Blaming Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.co
m/v/victim-blaming/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
104
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defense techniques.107 In the context of rape cases, attempts to place
blame on the victim often fail because of strictly enforced limitations
on admissible evidence through application of rape shield laws.108 The
laws protect victims of sexual crimes from being subjected to
questioning regarding their sexual history.109 The idea behind rape
shield laws is to encourage victims to come forward, rather than living
in silence, and mitigate likely biases of jurors who are “unduly
influenced and prejudiced” by hearing the details of a victim’s intimate
past.110
In Burton v. State,111 the court noted that “[a]rguments which
are calculated to appeal to the jury’s prejudice or passion are improper
because they pose a risk that the accused may be convicted for reasons
wholly irrelevant to his guilt or innocence.”112 In Burton, the defendant
appealed a conviction for a sex crime against a minor.113 The
defendant argued that, during trial, the prosecutor made improper
arguments that impacted the jury’s perception of him morally, that the
verdict was based on the values and emotions of the jurors rather than
the facts of the case.114 The court held that the prosecutor’s argument
was “not an improper appeal to community sentiment.”115 The
defendant’s argument rested upon the notion that, because of the
prosecutor’s inflammatory remarks, used solely to invoke the passions
of the jury, he was convicted, not because of the evidence presented or
the prosecutor’s case.116 The reasoning of that appeal is precisely what
makes the gay panic defense work, improper and prejudicial pleas to
biased jurors who feel more offended by the notion of gayness than
violence or murder. While the Burton case is unassociated with the
LGBT community and its efforts, the defendant’s argument reflects the

107

Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2009) (“In recent
decades, legislators across the country have moved to eliminate victim-blaming elements from
the law . . . to sharply limit the use of victim-blaming as the forensic tactic-of-choice for
lawyers.”).
108 See FED. R. EVID. 412.
109 Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search
for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 990 (2008).
110 Id.
111
46 P.3d 309 (Wyo. 2002).
112 Id. at 314.
113 Id. at 309.
114 Id. at 314-15.
115 Id. at 315.
116 Id. at 309.
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manner in which jurors’ passions may be capitalized to bring a guilty
verdict based on emotion and bias, rather than evidence, fact and law.
Critics of both rape shield laws and gay panic defense bans
argue that defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights are impeded by such
limitations.117 However, it is well-established that these Sixth
Amendment protections have limits, and the invocation of such rights
cannot “automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public
interests.”118 Above all, our judicial system rests upon a foundation of
“fair and efficient administration of justice.”119 It is paramount that, in
achieving justice, the victims’ rights are brought into consideration;
whether information may or may not be admissible depends on the
“potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial
process [that] must also weigh in the balance.”120
To allow a victim’s sexual or gender identity to have any
bearing on the crime committed against him or her is synonymous with
the concept of victim-blaming; that the victim’s identity or status is
what caused the violence, rather than the defendant’s own choices or
impulses. It is to say, had the victim not been gay, he would not have
been murdered. The focus in the criminal trial must be the facts of the
case as to the accused, who is on trial, not the victim’s sexual
orientation or gender identity. Thus, gay panic defense bans should be
universally implemented to protect LGBT victims in the same way that
rape shield laws protect victims of sexual assault. Aside from the
defense being antithetical to current social acceptance of the LGBT
community, the gay panic defense is rooted in outdated victim-blaming
exercises; it is a flawed, pervasive technique that has no place in our
justice system.

117

118
119
120

U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646, 656 (1988).
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/9

20

Russo: Gay Panic Defense

2019
V.

GAY PANIC DEFENSE

831

CURRENT AND PENDING BANS

What this Note proposes is hardly impractical or impossible:
states must proactively put an end to the use of the gay panic defense
because of its detrimental impact on the legitimate function of the
criminal justice system. The failure of the vast majority of states to
enact legislation prohibiting gay panic defenses reflects uneasiness
with adapting the law to the progressive evolution of our society.121
Such legislation is feasible and possible as demonstrated by the
legislation enacted in California, Illinois and Rhode Island which bans
the gay panic defense.
A.

California

In 2014, California became the first state to ban use of the gay
panic defense in criminal proceedings, proposing, in its bill to amend
the Penal Code:
For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or heat of
passion . . . the provocation was not objectively
reasonable if it resulted from the discovery of,
knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender
expression, or sexual orientation, including under
circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted
nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the

121 See E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
38, 40 (1985) (describing the theories of legal evolution).
The “social” approach to legal evolution . . . is characterized by the
assertion that law is not an autonomous system, but an integral part of the
social life of a community. In these theories, it is not so much the law that
evolves, as it is society. As the language, culture, political system, and
economic structure of society evolve, the law changes with them.
See also Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, And The Regulation of Conflicts of
Interest in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 793, 795 (2006)
(describing the intricate relationship between law and society).
[L]aw must support social life . . . when existing law fails to do so, the
rules (and occasionally the concepts) of law change in order to furnish this
support. Changes in law . . . occur because the evolution of law cannot be
divorced from, but must reflect, the evolution of society.
Id.
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defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a
romantic or sexual relationship.122
The bill limits a defendant’s ability to assert provocation as a
defense for murder in reaction to a romantic attempt or interaction by
a member of the same sex under the laws of the state. Similar to the
way rape shield laws protect victims of sexual crimes in criminal trials
by limiting the defendant’s admission of the victim’s sexual history,
the gay panic defense ban precludes a defendant from introducing a
victim’s sexual or gender identity in precisely the same manner.123
Ultimately, the gay panic defense ban that remains in effect
today in California was likely made possible by an earlier act, The
Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act, which preceded the current law
by eight years having been enacted in 2006.124 The Act was named in
memory of a murder victim whose perpetrators attempted to employ
the panic defense, asserting that their discovery that the victim was
transgender instigated their homicidal reaction.125 It sets forth gender
and sexual orientation as protected categories under hate crimes and
aimed to curtail defendants’ abilities to “play upon bias in attempting
to win acquittal or to seek a lesser charge.”126
The Legislature expressed concerns with the use of “panic
strategies” in defense of violent crimes and the notion of jurors
acquitting violent defendants because of bias. The bill introduced a
jury charge, available at a party’s request:
Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion
influence your decision. Bias includes bias against the
victim or victims, witnesses, or defendant based upon
his or her disability, gender, nationality, race or
ethnicity, religion, gender identity, or sexual
orientation.127

122

Assemb. B. 2501, ch. 684 (Cal. 2014) (emphasis added), amending CAL. PENAL CODE §

192.
123 Analogous to admission of rape victim’s sexual past, the gay panic defense similarly
makes little sense. If, for example a man murdered a woman, he could never defend himself
by asserting that she was wildly promiscuous or that her non-violent sexuality struck panic in
him. The two are logically parallel to one another.
124 Assemb. B. 1160, ch. 550 (Cal. 2006).
125 Gwen Araujo and the Justice for Victims Act, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (June 9, 2010),
https://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/339.
126 Assemb. B. 1160, supra note 124.
127 See supra note 121.
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The law that remains on the books today128 constricts a
defendant’s tactical abilities by precluding any defense of provocation
based upon actual or perceived gender identity or sexual orientation.129
The ban was made possible, in part, with support from organizations
such as Equality California, which argued that the bill would make it
clear “that [violence] is never acceptable, and that there is no place for
prejudice against people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender.”130 The gay panic defense ban officially became law in
2014, despite arguments by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
that the ban “undermines core principles of the theory of
manslaughter” by doing away with the reduction in crime from murder
to manslaughter, a lesser charge, where the defendant kills as a result
of provocation or “intense emotion.”131
In accordance with
jurisprudence’s progression with societal values, the law rejects the
notion that one’s differing sexual orientation or gender identity is cause
for concern or panic resulting in a violent outburst. California’s gay
panic defense ban, however, when compared to that of the two
subsequent states to follow its lead, falls short in terms of the protection
it offers, in that it is too narrowly defined and does not account for all
of the ways in which defendants can assert the gay panic defense.
Focused only on instances in which the defendant asserts a provocation
defense, the ban fails to address the possibility of the defendant’s
asserting some form of the gay panic defense through another means,
namely insanity/diminished capacity, or self-defense.
B.

Illinois

Illinois followed California’s lead, introducing two new
provisions that limit the use of the defense:
Provided, however, that an action that does not
otherwise mitigate first degree murder cannot qualify
as a mitigating factor for first degree murder because of
the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim’s
sexual orientation.132

128

See supra note 122.

129

See supra note 119.
Assemb. B. 1160, supra note 124.
Id.
S.B. 1761, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017).

130
131
132
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Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an
intense passion in a reasonable person provided,
however, that an action that does not otherwise
constitute serious provocation cannot qualify as serious
provocation because of the discovery, knowledge, or
disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation.133
Illinois’ statute essentially states that the discovery of a
victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity may not suffice for an
assertion of the provocation defense and, more broadly, that any
attempt to mitigate the crime of murder will fail if based solely upon
similar discovery. With support from various public interest
organizations and civil rights groups, the bill passed unanimously in
both the State House and Senate and was subsequently signed into law
by the Governor.134 Illinois’ law follows California’s in that it
prohibits provocation as a defense because of a victim’s actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity, but the law has a
broader scope than California’s. In addition to prohibiting the use of
provocation under such circumstances, Illinois also limits a
defendant’s ability to use the gay panic defense in any capacity to
mitigate a charge of first degree murder. The Illinois law says that,
unless there would be some applicable defense without the gay panic
element, such a defense may not stand to mitigate the charge of first
degree murder, constricting the criminal defendant’s ability to escape
justice for their crime.
C.

Rhode Island

In July of 2018, the Rhode Island Governor, Gina Raimondo,
signed House Bill 7066 into law, which in addition to banning use of
the gay panic defense, wholly amended criminal trial procedure.135
[P]rovocation was not objectively reasonable if it
resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about, or
potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived
133

Id.
Equality Illinois 2017 LGBTQ Legislative Agenda: Advancing and Defending LGBTQ
Civil Rights, EQUALITY ILL., https://www.equalityillinois.us/2017-legis/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2019) (defining the complete agenda as “a package of bills to advance the civil rights
protections of LGBTQ Illinoisans in the criminal justice system, improve representation on
public boards and commissions and assist transgender Illinoisans”).
135 H.B. 7066, ch. 125 (R.I. 2018).
134

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/9

24

Russo: Gay Panic Defense

2019

GAY PANIC DEFENSE

835

gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual
orientation . . . . A defendant does not suffer from
reduced mental capacity based solely on the discovery
or, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the
victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity,
gender expression, or sexual orientation . . . . A person
is not justified in using force against another based
solely on the discovery of, knowledge about, or
potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived
gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual
orientation.136
Rhode Island is a state that has no record of the defense’s ever
being used or attempted; however, the sponsors of the legislation
voiced that the state “must specify that it is an invalid defense to ensure
that it remains unused.”137 The Rhode Island statute, arguably, is the
most encompassing law of the three states that have banned the gay
panic defense. However, the law did not pass without resistance.138 A
Republican state representative, Justin Price, expressed concerns that
such a ban would be harmful because it permits the withholding of
information (the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity) from
the jury and, thus, prevents them from making a sound decision.139
Nevertheless, Rhode Island’s statute bans the use of the
“unrecognized” defense under each of the three official defenses
through which it is typically brought: provocation, self-defense and
diminished capacity.
D.

Pending Legislation

Along with California, Illinois, and Rhode Island, similar
legislation banning use of the gay panic defense is pending in New
Jersey, Washington, and the District of Columbia.140 Additionally,
there is a pending federal bill that would prohibit such defenses in
136

Id.
Katherine Gregg, R.I. House Votes to End ‘Gay or Trans’ Panic Defense, PROVIDENCE
J. (May 22, 2018), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180522/ri-house-votes-toend-gay-or-trans-panic-defense.
138 Christianna Silva, The “Gay Panic” Defense for Murder Could be on Its Way Out, VICE
NEWS (July 20, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ywkp9m/the-gay-panic-defensefor-murder-could-be-on-its-way-out.
139 Id.
140 See supra note 8.
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federal criminal cases.141 The federal bill, in relevant part, states that
“no nonviolent sexual advance or perception or belief, even if
inaccurate, of the gender, gender identity or expression, or sexual
orientation of an individual may be used to excuse or justify the
conduct of an individual or mitigate the severity of an offense.”142 This
proposed legislation would be the broadest of the gay panic defense
bans, as it widely prohibits the use of gay panic defense tactics on any
level, for the reasons of excusing or justifying a defendant’s conduct.
The proposed federal ban would offer the greatest level of protections
to victims, and could serve as an influential model for the states to
adopt and follow. While successfully passing this bill at the federal
level would eliminate this defense tactic in federal courts, state courts
would not be bound by the law and state legislatures must act to codify
their own individual bans.143
VI.

CONCLUSION

Today, in every state except Rhode Island, Illinois, and
California, the “gay panic” defense exists as a fully-functional (but
unofficial) defense for violent crimes in state and federal court. By
asserting the gay panic defense, often as an undertone to a defense of
insanity, diminished capacity or provocation, defendants shift the
focus of the trial from their crime to the perceived or actual sexual
orientation or gender identity of the victim. The defense plays on
implicit bias and latent homophobia to shield the defendant from
responsibility due to inaccurate, but existing notions that gay and
transgender people are innate predators or sexual deviants.
The defense is an outdated technique that capitalizes on
lingering bias against the LGBT community by reducing a defendant’s
perceived culpability or absolving offenders entirely. It is based on
notions that LGBT victims are mentally ill, inferior, and frightening,
despite the medical rejection of such notions and the ever-growing
social progression contradicting such thought. Yet, the gay panic
defense continues to insult the integrity of the criminal justice system.

141

Gay and Trans Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2018, H.R. 6358, 125th Cong. (2018).
Id.
143 This is to say that at the federal level, as of this writing, the gay panic defense remains a
permissible means through which to defend a case, and individual state bans have no bearing
whatsoever on the defenses as used in federal courts proceedings. Similarly, the proposed
federal legislation would impact only cases appearing in federal courts.
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Furthermore, the admissibility of the defense harms LGBT people in
the very forum in which they, as victims, should be able to seek justice
and protection.
The fact is, defenses based on the discovery of a victim’s
minority status are rarely given validity in courts of law, but the
defense of gay panic has been allowed to disrupt our judicial system.
A defendant’s discovery that his victim was Muslim, or Jewish, or
Hispanic, or poor would never serve as a defense through which a
defendant would evade justice and walk free.
Victims of violent crimes deserve justice; however, the gay
panic defense often re-victimizes them and allows offenders to receive
reduced convictions and sentences based on the victim’s sexual
orientation or gender identity. Modern society has progressed to a
point where it is absurd to hinder our justice system because of an
obstacle rooted in aversion and fear of gay and transgender citizens.
To prohibit the defense would be a proactive effort by state legislators
that ought to be inspired by and modeled on the fashion of the three
states which have passed legislation banning the defense. The gay
panic defense is an affront to LGBT people in this country and a
weakness within the criminal justice system that must be managed by
states taking the initiative to protect all of its citizens. As Americans,
we must remember the observation of Dallin H. Oaks, that
[O]ur procedures are not the ultimate goals of our legal
system. Our goals are truth and justice . . . truth and
justice are ultimate values, so understood by our people,
and the legal profession will not be worthy of public
respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be
diverted from these goals.144
The complexities involved with transitioning our legal system
to represent our social understandings as modern Americans may be
arduous, but in order to reach the paramount goal of justice, we must
remove this blemish that remains.

144 Dallin H. Oaks, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility, 1975 BYU L. REV.
591, 596, https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.goog
le.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1039&context=lawreview.
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